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1. Foucault in Tunis
In 1965, at the age of thirty, Michel Foucault moved to Tunisia to teach at the University 
of Tunis. It was his first appointment as professor and his last stopover before he returned 
to France after years of travel through Europe and Latin America. When Foucault ar-
rived in Tunisia in search for the mystic picture of the Orient and for personal freedom, 
as he wrote in his diary, Tunisia was in-midst of turmoil.1 The country was among the 
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first French colonies in Africa to become independent in 1956. During the following 
years it struggled with the birth pangs of post-colonial societies: with political factional-
ism, experiments in social engineering and with various political ideologies from social-
ism to Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism. It struggled with its national identity and for 
the demarcation of its national boundaries and in particular against its former colonial 
power France. Surprisingly, Foucault, who could hardly neglect the social and political 
struggles within Tunisian post-colonial society, did not elaborate much on colonial and 
post-colonial societies in his main oeuvre, although he sometimes referred to his Tuni-
sian experiences in interviews and in his diaries. Whilst in Tunisia Foucault worked on 
his Archaeology of Knowledge, a tour de force through several hundred years of European 
history of ideas.2
Although Foucault did not take note of colonialism in his main works, his ideas made 
it into African studies. I will follow some of the traces of Foucault’s work in the history 
of colonial, post-colonial and post-post-colonial Africa.3 There are several limitations 
towards what this paper aims to do and what it can not do. The main discussion will 
be based on the concept of governmentality, as it was developed by Foucault in his later 
works. Foucault developed this concept of governmentality on the basis of European 
history, notably the history of France. When it was adapted by Africanist scholars, they 
often did so to overcome concepts that, due to their origin in European history, were 
regarded as “iron cages” of Western concepts.4 The question therefore is to which extent 
governmentality helped to escape these “iron cages” and at which costs? 
2. African Historians and Foucault
This paper will not follow the footsteps of Edward Said, who with his work Orientalism 
introduced Foucault into post-colonial studies, or Valentin Yves Mudimbe, who did this 
for Africa.5 Although I am aware that Foucault’s analysis of power and governance and 
his discourse analysis are somehow two sides of the same coin, his reception by post-
colonial studies on the one side and by historians and political scientists on the other 
seem to be based on different readings of Foucault’s œuvre. I argue that most authors 
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in the colonial metropolis than in Africa. Only a few authors have traced the production 
and impact of European discourses to colonial encounters in Africa.6 Within this indif-
ference towards the impact of discourse on social reality they might have been closer to 
Foucault than other historians. Callewart notes that Foucault was not a sociologist or a 
social historian: 
He wrote only very marginally about forms of exercise of power, or about power as an 
aspect of discourse. He always wrote about how the exercise of power is thought of, con-
ceptualized and expressed, placed on stage and thousand-fold turned around in many 
different types of discourses, from scientific analysis to handouts for practical implementa-
tion, from discursive practices to non-discursive procedures. He never claimed that you 
can, from these discourses, conclude what people, professions, social classes, governments 
do, what is put into action, what materializes in the real world. Even when he is speak-
ing of bio-power, of the techniques of disciplining the body, of governmentality, he is not 
describing and explaining social history, but the history of knowledge.7
Nevertheless did this not prevent social historians and anthropologists like Jean and John 
Comaroff or Megan Vaughan to regard Foucault more as a historian than he perhaps had 
actually been. The inspiration these historians derived from Foucault was rather one of 
perspective than of theory. Foucault himself occasionally denied to see his work as theory 
and tended to see it more as a tool-kit.8 Foucault’s denial to have formulated a coher-
ent body of theory and the often sketchy nature of his later work makes it not easier to 
discuss Foucault’s impact on African Studies.9 Nevertheless one may follow Bruce Ber-
man in his observation that such an ostentatious refusal was something that met with 
a growing dislike among historians and political scientist for universalising theories in 
the 1980s. Foucault came with the soft appeal of post-modernist theory-making.10 The 
first generation of African historians as well as sociologists and political scientists had 
widely used models and theories that they derived from their parent disciplines. Histo-
rians usually adapted the model of the nation state transferred from European history to 
their research in Africa. They wrote national histories for the emerging nation states of 
post-colonial Africa. Political scientists described the political change of Africa in terms 
of modernisation.11 The 1980s saw an increasing uneasiness with this situation. Already 
in 1976, the doyen of African history, Terence Ranger, spoke of a “state of crisis” of Afri-
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Ran Greenstein thus promoted Foucault as a way to heal the tensions between history 
and theory. Instead of looking for the applicability of universalising theories, historians 
should “focus [more] on the concrete ways in which social forces interact under specific 
circumstances”.13 Foucault’s importance for African studies therefore lies to some extent 
in the fact that he marks a generation gap and alternation that took place in the 1980s. 
South Africa was and remains until today a major case study for historians inspired by 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality. There was a strong French influence on South Af-
rican historians even before Foucault, notably the French Annales School. This “French 
connection” has probably contributed to an early reception of Foucault.14 In 1985 Jean 
Comaroff published her history of Christian missionaries in southern Africa.15 It became 
one of the first major works in African history that explicitly used Foucaultian concepts 
and terms for its analysis. The introduction illustrates the change in paradigm from 
Marxist and Weberian understandings of hegemonic ideology and colonial rule towards 
post-structuralist notions of discourse and disciplinary power. Her main question is how 
to locate missionaries into the orbit of colonialism. In contrast to earlier studies mis-
sionaries neither easily sided with the colonial state nor were positioned outside the 
colonial project. Foucault surely introduced her to a new way of puzzling together the 
many different agents of colonial rule and, as she later noted, to deconstruct “the master 
narrative of European imperial expansion – or, rather, its narrative of mastery – [that] 
would place the state at the centre of the story”.16 In the case of the Tswana, who lived 
along the Molopo River at the very periphery of the colony, the colonial state was only 
second to arrive at the scene. Long before the Tswana formally became part of British Be-
chuanaland in 1885 the Tswana encountered protestant missionaries and Boer settlers. 
Underlying this history was a spatial argument. What she describes is the establishment 
of a colonial order at the very periphery that was co-authored by many agencies. Colonial 
rule here could not be taken as something that was initiated, exclusively maintained and 
controlled by the state agency because the state was lately and then rarely present. But 
what connected all these different agencies with each other? In Body of Power, Spirit of 
Resistance it was a common ideology rooted in the doctrines of 19th century Protestant-
ism and Victorian culture. Some years later, in Of Revelation and Revolution, which Jean 
Comaroff published together with her husband John, the nearly absent colonial state at 
the very periphery of colonial territory had finally given way to an analysis of power in 
terms of culture. The Tswana were not so much conquered by Europeans, but converted 
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the civilising mission would certainly be a first-class candidate because it helped the 
Comaroffs to connect different agents and different spheres of colonial rule. Nevertheless, 
behind the palimpsests of Tswana’s complicity they assume a local authorship in these 
processes that authors in the 1990s described as localisation of modernity.17 
Timothy Mitchell was not looking at the periphery but at the very centre of a colo-
nial project in his work Colonizing Egypt published in 1988. The main discussion in 
the book is based on Cairo, which was not only the administrative centre but also the 
model for the future transformation of the whole of Egypt. Mitchell started his study on 
Egypt with the argument that techniques of disciplinary power originated not in central 
Europe but in colonial possessions. The first panoptic spaces of power were created in 
colonial India.18 For Mitchell this seems to have been more than merely an accident, 
because the disciplining of a society is a profoundly colonial project. In contrast to the 
Comaroffs, Mitchell does not attribute the emergence of particular techniques of disci-
plinary power to a hybrid authorship at the periphery, but to the (nearly) uncontested 
ability of colonial rulers to enforce new schemes. To colonise Cairo meant to infiltrate, 
reorder and transform existing spaces and to create new social spaces from the drawing 
board. It was an attempt to remodel Egypt as a barracks square and to gain extensive con-
trol over economic production. It was a project that reached from the creation of a new 
educational system to the town-planning of Cairo and to the statistical survey of Egypt. 
The territory, which the colonial state claimed as his sovereignty space, was constructed 
as a spatial framework for colonial knowledge production and policing. 
Mitchell’s rewriting of the colonial project in Egypt as a steady process in which patterns 
of colonial governmentality covered the whole territory, was not easily reproducible in 
other parts of the African continent. Notably in Sub-Saharan Africa (with the excep-
tion of South Africa) colonial rulers lacked the resources and often the intention to 
develop the institutional prerequisites for modern governmentality. Most authors there-
fore turned to describe fragments of such a governmentality. Megan Vaughan’s work on 
colonial politics of disease control and lunatic asylums gave way to a new field of inquiry 
into colonial governmentality.19 What looks at first as a classical topic for a Foucaultian 
analysis results in a balanced view on the limits of governmentality in colonial contexts. 
While Vaughan finds similar patterns in medical metropolitan and colonial discourses, 
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complex”. Many of the biomedical theories and interventions failed in southern Africa, 
because they did not fit into the political and social context of either colonial order or 
local African societies. The impact of colonial health control was limited by the colonial 
state’s meagre resources and knowledge about the African population. Due to this they 
were hardly “modern states” as they relied much more on occasional displays of repres-
sive power than on everyday techniques of surveillance and control. Moreover did the 
colonial discourse on health not play such a central role for the colonial administration as 
it did in Europe, which only in times of crisis, such as famine and epidemics, went back 
to schemes that can be described as politics of population. Further did colonial health 
discourses not easily acquire dominance over local knowledge; its dispositifs were based 
on quite different understandings and cultures of the body than they were common 
in local cultures.20 What differentiates metropolitan governmentality from its colonial 
counterpart was, according to Vaughan, the inability of the later to create “total worlds” 
that bound most Africans into an everyday regime of governmentality and disciplinary 
power.21 Frederick Cooper thus doubted in 1994 the Foucaultian paradigm of “capillary 
power” in the case of colonial order. Power in colonial societies, he wrote, “was more 
arterial than capillary-concentrated spatially and socially, not very nourishing beyond 
such domains, and in need of a pump to push it from moment to moment and place to 
place”.22 
If the colonial rulers achieved to create a “new, self-regulating field of the social”, they 
succeeded only in certain places or in certain situations.23 Certainly colonial rule was 
thought by its proponents and agents in ways that were influenced by European models, 
although, as Scott mentioned, there were significant differences how these “European 
models” were perceived.24 The history of colonial governmentality should be written as 
the history of transfer, which up until now has only been approached by a few authors. 
Neither political development in Europe nor in Africa occurred along straight lines. 
“There are significant alterations and discontinuities in European conceptions and prac-
tices of political power”, Scott wrote.25 So it was with the colonies. As one author has 
rightfully noted, colonial rule was characterised by a “simultaneity of the non-simultane-
ous”.26 Different stages of colonial penetration in different places resulted in different 
political rationalities. The politics of conquest existed next door to the establishment 
of centres of administration and “islands of cash-crop production”.27 In contrast to this 
heterogeneous mix of political rationality it seems to me that Foucault is rather assum-
20	 M.	Vaughan,	Curing	Their	Ills:	Colonial	Power	and	African	Illness,	Cambridge	99,	p.	0.
2	 Ibid.,	p.	2.
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ing that governmentality is characterised by the accomplishment of single or at least a 
dominant political rationality. 
Nevertheless, was this not only a question of different political traditions and experi-
ences of colonial politics, but also of different agents of colonial rule. I have argued 
elsewhere that the ability of the colonial state to maintain its prerogative of interpreta-
tion over its politics and agency was quite limited.28 Metropolitan discourses on modern 
political rationality certainly reached the colonies. But they did so in meticulous ways. 
The transfer occurred through many channels, not all of them were in the hand of colo-
nial bureaucracies. Missionaries usually had an important share, but an often different 
agenda from colonial bureaucrats. Their involvement in colonial rule was complex. In 
German colonies missionaries were often seen by the colonial administration as rivals for 
the prerogative of sovereignty in the colonial project. Many agents of the colonial state, 
especially the colonial military, showed little interest in the civilising mission of colonial-
ism, while missionaries saw this as the main goal of the colonial project. Colonial rule 
was seen by colonial officers, who, in the first years, gained an important influence over 
colonial politics, in terms of enforcement of brute power over Africans. Moreover did 
most colonial officers and bureaucrats belong to the Prussian nobility in contrast to the 
missionaries, who came from the lower and middle classes of the country side of East 
Elbia.29 Furthermorewe have to consider that in most colonial projects Europeans were 
a minority. The colonial order, whether it manifested itself in administrative practices, 
at barrack squares, in plantations, in hospitals and missions, was made up by Africans. 
These intermediaries of colonial rule were ordered to count huts for taxation, to report 
about their societies, or to exercise punishments and health campaigns. Governmentality 
assumes certain complicity and a common understanding of the political rationalities. 
Most studies on the role of intermediaries have shown that the Africans developed their 
own views and goals of colonial rule.30
One may argue that the difficulty of the colonial state to gain dominance over the colo-
nial project was a result of its teething troubles. But the history of colonial rule cannot be 
written as a successive enforcement of European political rationalities. By the end of the 
First World War colonial rulers became, as Cooper notes, increasingly frustrated by their 
failure to remodel African societies. The declaration of “indirect rule” as an official goal 
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failure as a change in the paradigms of their politics.31 In fact it was a partial capitulation 
in face of this failure to gain dominance over local political rationalities.
Foucault saw the emergence of a new form of political rationality (governmentality) as 
a reaction to the “demographic explosion” and industrialisation. This was based on a 
growing economic and administrative and coercive potential of the state in the 18th and 
19th centuries as well as new technologies and knowledge. Authority was thought and 
eventually constituted around discursive and coercive techniques for disciplining space, 
populations and individuals in order to create a new “modern” system of production 
and consumption. If Foucault concentrates on the emergence of the discourse rather 
than social realities, he is assuming a certain historical symbiosis between discourses of 
governmentality and the social and political transformation of European societies. Gov-
ernmentality is a discourse that corresponds with and results in the bureaucratization of 
the main sectors of societies: their economies, their political institutions and places of 
socialisation. The political rationality of governmentality connects these main sectors of 
societies and enables a mutual transfer of concepts and practices between them. Thus 
political institutions are able to embed economical discourses and goals. Places of sociali-
sation like the family or the school share concepts and practices with places of power and 
economics, like the barrack square or the factory, etc.
The diffusion of governmentality into society results in the normalisation of power. This 
is, according to Foucault, a continuous process of investigating, disciplining and regu-
lating subjects. Disciplinary and regulatory power presupposes mechanisms of power, 
which are already present and become effective in its establishment and dispersal. The 
presence of modern states in everyday life is thus rarely a problem and not only because 
of their developed administrative structures. While ordering the time and space of its 
society power realises itself in spatial and temporal configurations, creating and display-
ing itself in “serial rooms”.32 Just as the dispositions of the state are present in its institu-
tions they are also incorporated in its subjects. In the disciplinary society, the modern 
state tries to create its counterpart: a society that shares its dispositions and therefore, 
so to speak, understands its orders and, to a certain extent, agrees to the legitimacy of 
its actions. What Gregory describes as the “inherently spatializing” character of disci-
plinary power is its ability to penetrate and transform social space with its presence or 
representations of its presence.33 The modern state develops an overwhelming visibility 
by occupying its territory with representations of its power (monuments, administrative 
buildings, uniforms of its agents, etc.). Its disciplinary power is, due to its unspectacular 
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authority a new regime of visibility and representation of the sovereign emerged.35 The 
baroque state-rituals of the past were increasingly replaced by mundane and invisible 
representations of governmentality. The new disciplinary techniques produced a reversed 
visibility of power. Whereas power was by then visibly embodied in the sovereign, disci-
plinary power is much more “exercised through its invisibility”. If the visibility of power 
fades away in the mundane and everyday-life, the subjects of power are forced “to come 
into view, since their visibility assures the hold of the power exercised over them”.36 This 
new visibility of subjects is assured by the creation of spatial arrangements of societies 
(the prison, the modern city) and new technologies of knowing as they emerged with 
sciences, in particular medicine, criminology, pedagogy, mathematics and social sciences, 
and bureaucratic practices in the last two hundred years. 
Colonial governmentality did not emerge in such a historical symbiosis. It was brought 
to Africa by the conquest even if it was not always connected with the exercise of brute 
force. Colonial conquest was not only a military endeavour, but also a political project 
that aimed to fundamentally change African societies. If colonial governmentality was 
the result of such a conquest, then we have to take the specific feature of a colonial order 
in the making into account. James C. Scott suggested that historians should concentrate 
on how the targets of colonial power were formulated and in which fields of operation 
colonial power emerged and was maintained.37 Although there were certainly “histori-
cally heterogeneous rationalities through which the political sovereignties of colonial rule 
were constructed and operated”, I am going to suggest some common characteristics 
of colonial governmentality, which resulted from specific spatial and temporal fields of 
operation of colonial power. 
3. The Anti-Westphalian Colonial State
The dispersal of the idea of the territorial state around the globe is historically connected 
to the era of European imperialism and colonialism. With imperialism, as Clifton Crais 
argues, “mapping of frontiers and the creation of boundaries between polities gained 
special prominence in the European political imagination”.38 The process of exploring, 
mapping and conquering the African continent, often occurring simultaneously, was the 
prelude to a colonial transformation aimed at creating political entities that fitted into 
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conquerors, and creating these maps more precisely and adding knowledge about the 
population belonged to the first duties of the colonial administrators. Mapping, count-
ing bodies and property, entitling populations and rulers “were central to the creation 
of colonial subjects, their disciplining, and control over their bodies and their move-
ments”.39 The history of European colonialism can therefore be written as a process “in 
which colonial practices were inscribed both physically and psychologically on the terri-
tories and peoples subject to colonial control”.40 The question remains how far-reaching 
and how successful this colonial intervention was. 
In Europe’s colonial empires sovereignty was stripped off its territorial dimension. It 
was a recourse on pre-Westphalian models of core zones of sovereignty.41 For colonial 
bureaucrats and politicians in the metropolis the question of territoriality / sovereignty 
seemed not to be of high priority. The Congo Conference of 1884 outlined how to 
establish claims over a territory and not, as is sometimes stated, define the borders of co-
lonial territories. Thus the final documents of the conference can be read as a manifesto 
of colonial statehood. Colonial occupation was thought to be a prelude of a series of 
juridical rituals performed by Europeans in front of an African public. Protection treaties 
negotiated with African rulers legitimized colonisation in accordance with international 
law and marked the region as a sphere of influence against European rivals. By hoisting 
a flag of some kind (not always the national, but, as in the case of the Congo Free State, 
the Star-Spangled Banner) at the residence of an African ruler, the approbation was 
symbolically as well as actually performed. The Europeans, who were present in these 
initial moments of colonial state-building, did not always hold an official mandate of a 
European Government to act as its representative. Henry Morton Stanley made his trea-
ties with African Chiefs in the Congo Basin while on an official mission of the Belgian 
King Leopold II. The King was not the actual head of the Belgian state; in fact he was by 
then no more than a private investor, who was tricking the European public by posing 
as the head of state. The notorious Carl Peters, who travelled in 1883 to East Africa to 
conclude protection treaties with East African chiefs, did so without an official approval 
by the German Empire. Originally he thought of establishing his very own private em-
pire, which he wished to sell off to the highest bidding protecting power. Only when 
he presented his treaties on the eve of the Congo Conference did he receive his official 
mandate from the German Emperor. The same conference entitled the Belgian King as a 
sovereign over his shadow possessions in the Congo and with him Stanley as his official 
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territories were made but also their sovereigns. In 1884 the German delegation voted 
for a European sovereignty / territoriality model to be adopted for defining the validity 
of claims at the Berlin Congo-Conference. European colonial powers were assured of 
their claims by rivals only after they proved to have established a sound administra-
tive network throughout the country. Nevertheless the German novices in colonial em-
pire-building were quickly advised by the British that the implementation of European 
standards of statehood would be too costly. The British prevailed with their views and 
the Germans soon experienced the advantages that came with a low-level engagement in 
colonial state-building.42
This juridical choreography of colonisation was, vaguely defined as it was, unsoundly 
based on international law. An African ruler – whose power was seldom based on ter-
ritorial rights – was declared a sovereign over a territory with whom one could negotiate 
the cession of that territory. Sovereignty was thus “invented as an unavoidable part of 
colonial conquest because of the necessity of identifying the political subjects of em-
pire”.43 Simultaneously, this however invented sovereignty of African rulers over a certain 
territory was denied to him by the European concept of “ownerless sovereignty”. This 
concept negated per se the existence of states and statehood in Africa. It was partly the 
result of Europe’s limited knowledge of African political structures; partly it was a strat-
egy to legitimise colonial projects. Before Africa was conquered, its political landscape 
had to be erased and its rulers de-legitimised as cruel and irresponsible tyrants by colonial 
discourse. 
Once the colonial state set its first footholds on the African soil the anti-Westphalian 
nature of the colonial state became obvious. The Westphalian state established a par-
ticular regime of visibility. As in most other colonial projects, colonial rulers in German 
Eastern Africa for instance struggled with their presence and therefore with their ability 
to project the sovereignty over its African subjects in their daily life over many years. 
The presence of colonial rulers, like in most other colonial territories, was scattered on 
“islands of rule”. Colonial economies were merely “islands of cash crop production”.44 
Sovereignty was vested in the use of state-symbols and in the performance of state-rituals 
and rituals of statehood. It was vested in simulations of a territorial state. Notwithstand-
ing, the Westphalian model remained a strong imagination for colonial politics. The 
territorial image still prevailed in the everyday colonial politics and thus created it as an 
imagination.45 Colonial expeditions stopped at the borders of the colonies even if they 
chased resisting Africans. Bureaucratic practises of report and accounting created the 
colonial territory as a framework that was defined by spatial categories. The introduction 
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the birthday of the Emperor, the Queen and the 14th July were invented by the colony 
as a territory. They were to be held at every colonial station in the German, French and 
British colonies and later also reported in the newspapers of the colony and in adminis-
trative reports. 
The question of the territoriality of the colonial state may thus open new perspectives 
on the sovereignty of the colonial state. My first point to make here is that the territo-
riality / sovereignty nexus of the colonial state can be seen as an exchange coin in global 
politics at the end of the 19th century. Since the Westphalian process in 1644 territorial-
ity had emerged as the dominant way to describe the spatial dimensions of sovereignty 
in Europe. During the partition of Africa on negotiation tables of 19th century European 
diplomacy this sovereignty / territoriality nexus was also the blueprint for the political 
landscape of colonial Africa. Nevertheless, the imperial expansion became also the first 
major event in the history of Europe to challenge the Westphalian nexus of sovereignty /
territoriality. 
4. The Politics of Campaigning
What is often neglected in studies of colonial governmentality is the question of time. 
Foucault describes the emergence of the new rationality of governance as a gradual proc-
ess over a time span of nearly three hundred years or more. In order to become an ef-
fective form of governance, this new rationality has to lodge itself into the everyday-life 
of its subjects. This is something that cannot be achieved overnight and time, or more 
exactly, durability is the important resource of governmentality. Had the colonial rul-
ers of Africa enough time to impose colonial governmentality as a political rationality? 
This is thereby not an accident that South Africa became the heartland of Foucaultians 
not only due to the “French connection” but also because colonial rule with its relative 
long history there opened a window for a longue durée investigation into colonial rule. 
South Africa is the most ancient project of modern colonialism in Africa. It was founded 
as a Dutch settlement in 1652, nearly 250 years before the scramble for Africa started 
in most parts of the continent. The initial phase of colonial conquest started here at the 
end of the 18th century, a hundred years before it did for most of Africa. If we speak 
of colonial history in southern Africa we are dealing with a time-frame of more than 
two hundred years, which is hardly the case for most parts of Africa where the colonial 
episode was usually far briefer. In most colonial territories of Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
the initial phase of colonial conquest only ended with the end of the First World War, 
colonial rule became settled in the inter-war years.46 
The First World War was a watershed between the period of colonial conquest and the 
emergence of colonial governance. In most parts of Africa, the politics of conquest had 
46	 C.	Young,	The	African	Colonial	State	(footnote	4);	J.	I.	Herbst,	States	and	Power	in	Africa:	Comparative	Lessons	in	
Authority	and	Control,	2000.	
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not coincided with a pervasive institutionalisation of colonial rule. One reason for the 
underdeveloped colonial state during the period of colonial conquest was the fact that 
the conquest afforded relatively few resources. In most colonial projects, the number of 
troops used for the conquest hardly exceeded a few thousand. Measured against the huge 
territories, the administrative staff was comparatively small. Nevertheless, the anti-West-
phalian nature of the colonial state in the making limited the goals of colonial conquest. 
In many places, the establishment of colonial rule took more the character of a fragile 
armistice than it led to the establishment of effective patterns of colonial administration. 
This changed with the First World War. The war efforts of the involved colonial powers 
resulted in the introduction of new forms of bureaucratic rule and economic manage-
ment. This was particularly the case in Eastern Africa, where the military confrontation 
between Allied and German forces lasted four years. New needs and chances arose during 
that period to transform the largely unknown African into a member of a population. In 
British East Africa the newly created Military Labour Bureau issued thousands of iden-
tity cards for military labourers, which, after the war, became a basis for the bureaucratic 
management of colonial labour force. With military labour came the registration and 
military training. Investigations into the food-habits and health of Africans produced 
a knowledge that formed the basis of colonial bio-politics. Nevertheless, the colonial 
panopticum had a limited reach; so it was with colonial policies. Within the context of 
the war economy of British East Africa the colonial state mustered resources till then 
unavailable but only limited to the short period of time of the war. By the end of the war, 
some projects prevailed, but many were quickly abandoned because they threatened to 
exceed the meagre budgets of colonial administrations.47 
It is worth mentioning that one of the first moments when we can speak of the emer-
gence of a sort of colonial governmentality is connected to a crisis. The inter-war period 
was in this regard a time of transition. With the introduction of Indirect Rule the colo-
nial state disengaged from a further penetration of African societies. On the other hand, 
this period saw in most African colonial territories an increasing grip of colonial rulers 
on African societies. There were investigations on all matters of life of Africans. For the 
aim of tax gathering Africans were counted and categorised. To fit into the principles of 
indirect rule, which was introduced at the beginning of the 20th century by most colonial 
governments in one form or another, Africans had to be drawn up as separate social and 
political populations. Whereas the imagination of Africans as populations was based on 
similar techniques of counting, categorizing and investigating like in the metropolis, it 
was not aimed at the production of homogeneity but of differences.48 Within the context 
of Indirect Rule different political rationalities were ascribed to these populations and, as 
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Nevertheless, many of these colonial counting campaigns rarely went beyond mere es-
timates. South Africa seems to have been a forerunner in introducing this particular 
technique of governmentality on the African continent. As early as in 1690 the first 
census was held in the Cape Colony. By 1862 the first Census Act had been passed in 
the colony setting the norms and procedures of future census. What is therefore more 
relevant is that even with humble beginnings of the first censuses, which covered only 
parts of the colony’s population, it was followed by regularly held censuses over the next 
300 years. Each of the censuses successively widened its scope as the colonial conquest 
continued and more and more Africans came under colonial rule.49 The first census in 
British West Africa was held in 1871 for the city of Lagos. It took another forty years to 
widen the geographical scope, when in 1911 a house-to-house enumeration was made 
in some ports and townships. Only in 1921 was the first attempt at a systematic census 
for the entire population made by the administration. But the colonial administration 
struggled with an underfunded budget and untrained staff and sometimes also with a 
fragile political situation in many peripheral parts of the colony. Moreover, there seemed 
to exist a general mistrust for the results of the census and some were corrected according 
to estimates of colonial officers.50 
Later phases of colonial rule saw increasing potentialities and a willingness on the side 
of colonial bureaucracies to project the dispositifs of colonial governmentality to African 
societies and to transform the subjugated into subjects and people into populations. 
Like in the case of the First World War a current crisis of European Empires led to a 
modernisation of colonial rule. The Second World War saw, as Crawford Young argues, 
a change in colonial politics. The doctrine of colonial self-sufficiency, which had previ-
ously been an obstacle to the development of colonial rule, was partially abandoned. 
The once isolated and autonomously acting colonial field agents became embedded in 
a hierarchy, which “was now fleshed out with a proliferating array of technical services”. 
Developmentalism was the new “mantra” of post-war colonial politics and was followed 
by attempts of economic planning and social engineering.51 But was this the arrival of 
governmentality in Africa?
At least in terms of space and time colonial politics were much more characterised by 
campaigns than by the everyday routine of governmentality. Most of these attempts 
were spatially and temporally limited or were quickly abandoned. A campaign is to be 
understood here as a temporary and concentrated attempt to change within a short time 
span particular aspects of social configurations of a given society. The Oxford Dictionary 
gives two meanings of “campaign”: it is either “a series of military operations intended 
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or “an organized course of action to achieve a goal”.52 In colonial contexts campaigns, 
to transform African societies, represented in certain matters a continuity of techniques 
of conquest like the expedition. And sometimes medical campaigns turned into military 
campaigns against a reluctant population as was the case with the plague expedition of 
the German doctor Max Zupitza to Lake Victoria in 1898, which ended in the devasta-
tion of several villages.53 
The idea to change societies through particular campaigns is connected to what James 
C. Scott has described as “high modernism”.54 They are typical for historical situations 
of rapid change, where elites took up the challenge to transform societies in a relatively 
short period of time. Soviet Russia initiated in the 1920 and 1930s a number of cam-
paigns, in which the communist elites tried to catapult the rural population, which they 
regarded as backward, into the future world of socialism within a few years. Underlying 
the discourse of such campaigns is the understanding of a deep rift between spheres 
of a society as they were common in post-revolutionary Russia and in colonial situa-
tions. Colonial campaigns for the introduction of new crops, disease control and against 
“amoral” behaviour were engineered according to discourses, which were accompanied 
by a vocabulary of “control”, “modernisation” and “improvement”. They were perhaps 
the most common techniques of colonial governmentality. As Megan Vaughan notes, the 
encounter of Africans with colonial medicine in the first half of the 20th century was pre-
dominately through the “great campaign”.55 Also, attempts to change the patterns of ru-
ral agricultural production in colonial Africa were exercised mostly through campaigns.56 
If some authors recognised in the rise of developmentalism in the inter-war period the 
major theme of colonial politics then the campaign became a major technique to enforce 
it. As in the first colonial conquest this second colonial conquest met the resistance of 
African societies. Marie Luise White has described some forms of this resistance in her 
book Speaking with Vampires.57 Nevertheless, colonial campaigns illustrate the shifting 
alliances within colonial projects as well. Venereal disease campaigns in colonial Buganda 
met the enthusiastic support of local chiefs, because they hoped to acquire more control 
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was initiated by missionaries and the colonial administration, but found its staunchest 
supporters in the urban African elite. It was again the question for the control of women 
which drove African elites into the ranks of colonial campaigners.59
Although campaigns often use the language of metropolitan governmentality, they differ 
in their techniques. Campaigns have another regime of visibility and temporality. Many 
colonial campaigns were reactions to current crisis, notably as a reaction to diseases, fam-
ines and social unrest that were a result of the rapid transformations of African societies 
in the inter-war period and after the Second World War.60 Often their short-term goals 
were only vaguely connected to long-term strategies of the colonial administration. With 
the crisis gone or solved by successful campaigns, the colonial state reduced its high-pro-
file engagement and disappeared behind the veil of indirect rule. Regarding the chronic 
shortness of funds of colonial administration, it is no wonder that short-lived campaigns 
gained such an importance for colonial politics. If we can speak of a disciplinary power 
in these contexts, then it was not enforced through the constant acquisition of a habi-
tus, but by the magic of propaganda and violence. The introduction and maintenance 
of colonial rule was much more characterised by the spontaneity and forcefulness of 
campaigns than the ordinary and reformative change that seems to me typical for the 
emergence of what Foucault described as governmentality.
5. Afterword: The Political Rationality of Developmentalism
The concept of governmentality and disciplinary power offered new possibilities to histo-
rians to describe the peculiar nature of colonial rule in Africa. First of all, the Foucaultian 
notion of governmentality de-centred the previous focus on the colonial state. Foucault 
came into African history in the middle of the debate on the questions of the magnitude 
of the colonial and post-colonial state.61 The ability of the colonial state to establish 
itself as an institutional framework for bringing Africans under the tutelage of colonial 
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view on a non-state agency in the process of an establishment of colonial rule. Foucault 
thus helped historians of colonial rule to collect the broken pieces of the colonial state, 
which had been smashed by a new generation of historians and political scientists in the 
1980s. To describe the colonial state as an institution had certainly lost its momentum, 
but it could now be taken as something that was softer than institutions. It was a new 
rationality that produced discourses and techniques of governance. But what was eas-
ily overlooked is that the Foucaultian notion of governmentality bore in itself a certain 
“dogmatic functionalism”.63 Despite using his concept of governmentality to dethrone 
the state as the sole agent of power in modern Europe, he still sticks to the state as a 
central agent. 
As the colonial state had been part of an imperial world order, the post-colonial state, 
which was to emerge in the process of decolonization, became a subject of a post-war 
world order of nation-states even if many of these nations were in an ambiguous state. 
This world order, with its different political power blocs and centres, constructed its sub-
jects, the nation-states, according to its premises. Crawford Young hints at the semantic 
metamorphosis of the “new” or “post-independent states” into “post-colonial states” or 
states of the Third World in the context of global discourses in the wake of decolonisa-
tion.64 Most former colonies, in particular former French and British, developed special 
relationships with their former colonial powers. This led some authors to conclude that 
the post-colonial state was the continuation of Indirect Rule. But this did not happen 
within the space of the territorial defined and organized colonial state but within the 
framework of the post-colonial world order.65
Much more such continuation in early post-independence politics than one could have 
expected had been exercised. Major development schemes that were started or planned 
after the Second World War were continued by nationalist politicians like the Volta-River 
Project in Ghana or the Geschira irrigation-scheme in the Sudanese Nil delta.66 Develop-
mentalism became a vision of nationalist elites of the post-independence states as well as 
of major global institutions. Some authors see in the emergence of the developmentalist 
institutional framework (the UNO, the World Bank, and the IMF) the creation of a 
“single social field” that was shaped by Foucaultian dispositifs of social engineering.67 The 
new states / post-colonies quickly joined a variety of international organisations from the 
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still prevailed as a major theme in the political rationalities of post-colonial Africa, the 
campaign remained the appropriate tool for its enforcement. Post-colonial campaigns 
tried, like their colonial predecessors, to introduce new techniques of agricultural pro-
duction and schemes for the prevention of diseases. They promoted new forms of habitus 
and (national) patterns of identity and fought against remains of “tribalism” and “colo-
nialism”. Nearly every new president in post-colonial Africa launched his own anti-cor-
ruption campaign. Ghana under Nkrumah saw several campaigns for new dresses for 
women, for back-yard gardening in support of the politics of self-reliance.68 Nyerere’s 
pronunciation of Ujamaa was followed by numerous campaigns for new settlement 
schemes, alphabetisation and the introduction of mechanized agriculture.69 In William 
Tolbert’s Liberia campaigns became “sloganised responses to festering problems”, such as 
‘Rallytime’, ‘Higher Heights’ and ‘Mats to Mattresses’ campaigns.70 
African elites eagerly took over the sovereignty / territoriality paradigm. “Seek the politi-
cal kingdom first”, as Kwame Nkrumah put it in his famous phrase, was meant to inherit 
the shallow sovereignty of the colonial state. For Nkrumah and most of the African 
nationalists of the first generation the political kingdom lay at the capital and the main 
urban centres. The national state became the main framework for the political emanci-
pation. This nationalisation of African political movements was quite astonishing with 
regards to the strong Pan-African tradition of the first generation of the then converted 
nationalists. The political kingdom the nationalists hoped to achieve was not a coherent 
political space nor was it a sovereignty-scape. African elites inherited the instruments of 
statehood from the colonial state but not the power that came with it in colonial days. 
The nationalist movements, which brought the African elites to power, quickly lost their 
momentum as a political force of national relevance simply because there was no nation 
to rely on. The problem for most post-colonial states was that they faced a mixture of 
different political traditions and systems. The politics of indirect rule had persevered al-
though to a certain extent in a transformed manner. Some pre-colonial institutions and 
the political tradition of African elites themselves were a highly hybrid mixture of Chris-
tian, liberal, Marxist and nationalist ideologies, not to speak of the artificial boundaries 
inherited from colonial times. Somalia is here an interesting case to point out. After 
gaining independence from Britain and Italy Somali nationalists resorted to the idea 
of a Somali nation that included people living in the neighbouring countries of Kenya, 
Ethiopia and Djibouti. This led to more than 50 years of civil and inter-state war at the 
horn of Africa. The Congo (Zaire) is another example. The artificial creation included 
such heterogeneous political traditions as the former Congo-Kingdom and the former 
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of the two examples for an experiment with federal structures in post-colonial Africa. 
The other, Nigeria, was to a great part abandoned after the Biafra-War.
Therefore “Tribalism” and “Balkanization” became the ghosts in post-colonial discourses 
on statehood. When Nkrumah was faced after the independence by the Ashanti-Aris-
tocracy with the slogan: “we are the true rulers” he reacted with condemnation of tribal 
tendencies that endangered the young nation and later with imprisonment of some of 
the Ashanti rulers. The struggle against tribalism was aimed at overcoming the fragmen-
tation of the political space of the post-colony. Whereas Nkrumah lost this struggle, 
many other African leaders tried to manipulate the fragmented political space of the 
post-colony. The fear of Balkanization was based on the peculiarity of post-colonial state-
building. Unlike Europe, where borders were the result of state-building processes, the 
African post-colonial state started with borders as a prerequisite. This made, as Clapham 
argues, the question of boundaries one of the most important for the survival of the post-
colonial state.71 In Africa’s arena for international norm building, the Organisation of 
African Unity, the inviolability of former colonial borders became one of first principles 
for inter-state relations. 
As I have argued at the beginning of my paper the maintenance of the sovereignty / ter-
ritoriality nexus depends on a certain amount of resources that are available to agents 
of sovereignty like the state. The state in Africa, in its colonial and post-colonial shape, 
failed to dominate or even create a political field where his dispositifs were embedded. 
Paradoxically, many academics, as well as politicians and NGO employees, reacted to the 
failure of the sovereignty / territoriality nexus in post-colonial Africa with a Foucaultian 
language: Where there was no sovereign government to perform control over a terri-
tory to be found, many authors looked for some sort of governmentality. The failure 
of the state is answered by many commentators with concepts of a neo-liberal global 
governmentality. Nevertheless it seems doubtful that the globally circulating techniques 
will heal the African states as they emerge as a prerequisite of colonial and post-colonial 
governmentality.72 
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